This article considers two recent lines of research concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated events that can provide insight into the relationship between memory and decision making. One line of research concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating episodes that might occur in one's personal future, and the other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which involves simulating episodes that could have happened in one's personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of episodic simulation engage a common core network including medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging studies have documented neural differences between episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking, including differences in hippocampal responses. We next consider behavioral studies that have delineated both similarities and differences between the two kinds of episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for decisions.
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that memory and decisions are closely related, but it is only relatively recently that the neural processes linking memory and decision-making have been the targets of systematic study. One emerging line of research that can potentially illuminate the relationship between memory and decisions centers on the role of a particular kind of memory -episodic memory, or the recollection of specific happenings in one's personal past (Tulving, 1983 (Tulving, , 2002 ) -in the construction of imagined or simulated events. This line of work has focused on the process of episodic simulation (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008) , where one draws on elements of past experiences in order to envisage hypothetical scenarios that might occur in one's personal future or might have occurred in one's personal past. In line with this general characterization, we can distinguish between two major kinds of episodic simulation: episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. Episodic future thinking involves the construction of possible future personal episodes or scenarios (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 2010) , whereas episodic counterfactual thinking involves simulating alternative versions or outcomes of past personal episodes that could have happened but did not occur (De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; see Table 1 for definitions of these and other key terms). During the past few years, there has been an explosion of research concerning episodic future thinking, motivated to a large extent by the observation that a common core brain network is involved in both episodic memory and episodic future thinking (for a recent review, see Schacter et al., 2012) . Though there has been less research concerning episodic counterfactual thinking, several recent papers have explored aspects of the phenomenon and its relationship to episodic memory (e.g., De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2013; Gerlach, Dornblaser, & Schacter, 2014; Van Hoeck et al., 2013) .
It is important to note that episodic future and episodic counterfactual thinking appear to be distinct from general future and counterfactual thinking, whereby the contents of the mental simulations involve only impersonal and non-autobiographical events.
